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We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial 
transactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, 
public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private transactions, and can influence 
consumption allocation. We show that efficient transfer schemes should take into account the 
impact of insurance on unobservable effort and saving choices as well as the relative cost of 
public and private insurance technologies. We provide suggestive evidence for the empirical 
relevance of these results by inspecting the cross-country relationship between available 
indicators of insurance transaction costs and variation in public and private insurance. 
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This paper links insights from the classic analyses of insurance provision to the recent literature
on dynamic public ￿nance to investigate the feasibility and nature of public insurance schemes
in the presence of hidden private insurance transactions. Public and private insurance provision
coexist in reality, and we ￿nd that transaction costs are important both for the existence of public
insurance schemes and the observed di⁄erences of public and private insurance provision across
countries.
A recent literature explores the relationship between hidden actions and e¢ cient consumption
allocations. In that literature, the social e¢ ciency of consumption allocation under uncertainty is
constrained by individual agents￿private interactions. The hidden-information problems studied
by Mirrlees (1971), Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), and many other contributions to the ￿New
Dynamic Public Finance￿ literature let income be observable and determined by e⁄ort choices
based on privately observed ability realizations. In that setting, insurance contracts may be signed
and public policies designed before ability levels are realized, but only non-contingent self-insurance
is possible when assets are traded by agents who have private information about their own ability
and exert e⁄ort privately to determine observable income.
In this paper we focus on costly insurance transactions as a reason why, in the real world, gov-
ernments do implement insurance-oriented policies at the same time as private ￿nancial contracts
also provide contingent payo⁄s. We are not the ￿rst to highlight the importance of transaction
costs for hidden insurance trades. Bisin and Gottardi (1999) show that nonlinear prices of private
insurance due to transaction costs are important to ensure equilibrium existence, and Gottardi and
Pavoni (2009) show in a similar setting that a linear tax on hidden insurance trades is optimal.
Other nonlinearitities have also been studied, for example as regards costs for private ￿rms to
monitor insurance purchases (Ales and Maziero, 2009). Our novel approach focuses on the role of
explicit insurance costs in an environment where nontrivial securities can o⁄er payo⁄s contingent on
idiosyncratic realizations. We model price nonlinearities in terms of a smooth technology that dis-
plays decreasing returns in processing insurance transactions. This allows us to build on standard
results and makes the resulting modeling environment suitable for our purpose of characterizing
2real-life public and private provision of insurance.
Section 2 sets up a modeling framework based on the hidden-action moral hazard workhorse
of both classic insurance theory, such as Pauly (1974) and Shavell (1979), and of recent contri-
butions to dynamic public ￿nance such as `brahÆm and Pavoni (2005). In doing so, we brie￿ y
review existing characterization results on the constrained-e¢ cient consumption allocation with
hidden e⁄ort and non-contingent saving choices. Since privately chosen e⁄ort only determines
the probability distribution of observable income realizations, the economy is not limited to self-
insurance. Extending the model to allow for hidden trade in state-contingent securities, Section 3
shows that price-taking behavior fails to internalize e⁄ort incentives, resulting in excessive supply
of non-exclusive unit insurance contracts. Public policy is completely unable to address these in-
centive issues if costless competitive trade of such securities fully o⁄sets not only random shocks,
but also any public contingent transfers. Section 4 then characterizes the equilibrium and the
constrained-e¢ cient allocation if insurance transactions are costly. We show that if the underwrit-
ing cost for private insurance contracts depends nonlinearly on the amount of such transactions,
public transfers cannot be fully undone by private markets. Public contingent transfers can thus
a⁄ect the equilibrium allocation and improve the trade-o⁄ between consumption smoothing and
e⁄ort incentives to an extent that, as we illustrate with a numerical example, depends on the size
and shape of private transaction costs. In Section 5 we show that transaction costs for public and
private insurance are sizeable and heterogeneous across OECD countries and brie￿ y assess the em-
pirical relationship between indicators for transaction and administration costs and the amounts
and composition of insurance across developed countries. Section 6 concludes.
2 Insurance and hidden actions
When it is possible to verify the realization of relevant events but information on their probabil-
ity is incomplete and asymmetric, only partial insurance is feasible. We characterize the extent
and character of consumption smoothing adapting a standard two-period hidden-action problem
(`brahÆm and Pavoni, 2005) which focuses on insurance of ex-ante identical individuals and allows
for an analytic characterization of the consumption allocation.
3In the ￿rst period, agents derive utility u(c1) from consumption, with u0(x) > 0 and u00(x) < 0
for all x. They also derive additively separable disutility ￿v(e1) from e⁄ort. We assume that
v0(x) > 0, v00(x) > 0 for x >e
ﬂ
, the lowest-e⁄ort bound, and v0(x) = 0 for x ￿ e
ﬂ
. E⁄ort, which
is privately observed, in￿ uences the probability f(zje1) that in the second and last period of the
model income y2 equals z, for each z > 0 in the support Y2 of income realizations. We suppose
that f(zje1) > 0 for all z 2 Y2 and all e1: this ￿full-support￿assumption ensures that e⁄ort can
never be inferred from the realization of income. And we let fe(zje1) ￿ @f(zje1)=@e1 be increasing
in z so that higher e⁄ort increases the mean of the income distribution since
X
fz2Y2g
f(zje1) = 1 )
X
fz2Y2g
fe(zje1) = 0 (1)
implies
P
fz2Y2g zfe(zje1) > 0, as fe(zje1) is negative (positive) in the lower (higher) portion of
the income distribution￿ s support. The stronger, commonly-made assumption that the likelihood
ratio fe(zje1)=f(zje1) monotonically increases in z delivers the sensible and realistic implication
that constrained-e¢ cient consumption levels also are an increasing function of income realizations.
In the second and last period of the model economy, individual consumption is in general a
function c(z) of income realizations. If the resulting utility u(c(z)) is discounted by a factor ￿,
individual maximization with respect to e⁄ort e1 of








u(c(z))fe(zje1) = v0(e1): (3)
Next, we proceed to characterize the constrained-e¢ cient allocation in this standard hidden-
action problem. We ￿rst brie￿ y review existing results for a problem with hidden e⁄ort and discuss
how the constrained-e¢ cient allocation changes if we also allow for hidden non-contingent savings.
We then make our contribution and extend the model to hidden (costly) state-contingent insurance
4transactions.
2.1 Hidden e⁄ort and savings
The principal-agent problem with hidden e⁄ort can be studied using the ￿rst-order condition
(3) as an incentive compatibility constraint if the likelihood ratio fe(zje1)=f(zje1) is monotoni-
cally increasing in z and the cumulative distribution function of z is convex in e⁄ort (Rogerson,
1985b). These su¢ cient conditions justify the so-called ￿rst-order approach to characterization of
the constrained-e¢ cient allocation of c1, e1, and fc(z)g, whereby the typical individual￿ s welfare
(2) is maximized subject to (3) and the aggregate resource constraint.
If resources can be reallocated without cost across individuals and transferred over time ac-
cording to a given social rate of transformation R = 1+r, and there are so many individuals as to
let f(zje1) represent the population fraction as well as the probability of income realizations, the
relevant Lagrangian is






















where ￿ is the shadow price of aggregate resources as of period 1, and ￿ the shadow price of the
incentive compatibility constraint for e⁄ort.









, 8z 2 Y2, (5)
a constrained-e¢ ciency condition that would call for constant consumption and full insurance if it
were the case that fe(zje1) = 0, which implies ￿ = 0. When instead e⁄ort a⁄ects the probability
distribution of income realizations, the shadow price of the incentive constraint is positive, and (the
5marginal utility of) consumption in the second period generally depends on the income realization
y2.1
Summing (5) over the support of second period income realizations, and recalling (1), yields a











Since 1=x is a convex function, Jensen￿ s inequality and (6) imply




If it is possible to access a ￿nancial market where assets yield the social rate of intertemporal
transformation 1 + r, however, it is individually optimal to satisfy the standard Euler equation




which is inconsistent with (6) when consumption is not constant across z. Since individuals bene￿t
from shifting some of the ￿rst-period consumption to the future and from exerting less e⁄ort,
e¢ ciency is thus further constrained when savings are not observable.
When both e⁄ort and savings are chosen privately, e¢ ciency need not in general be character-
ized by maximization of (2) subject to the aggregate resource constraint and the individual ￿rst-
order conditions (3) and (7), because the relevant concavity conditions may be violated. `brahÆm,
Koehne and Pavoni (2009) show that the ￿rst-order approach remains valid if one imposes the
su¢ cient conditions of a monotone likelihood ratio, a utility function with non-increasing absolute
risk aversion and a log-convex probability distribution function. To characterize the constrained-
e¢ cient consumption allocation, we can then add (7) to the Lagrangian (4), with shadow price !,












we see that (the marginal utility of) consumption varies across income realizations if the likelihood ratio does. If
fe(zje1)=f(zje1) increases in z, so does consumption.
6to obtain


































f(zje1) + ￿￿u0(c(z))fe(zje1) ￿ !￿(1 + r)u00(c(z))f(zje1) = 0,
which can be rearranged to
￿
￿(1 + r)u0(c(z))
= 1 + ￿
fe(zje1)
f(zje1)




Thus, the constrained-e¢ cient shape of c(z) now depends not only on that of the likelihood ratio
fe(￿)=f(￿), but also on that of the risk-aversion coe¢ cient ￿u00(￿)=u0(￿). Since @L2=@c1 = 0 implies
that ￿ = u0(c1) + !u00(c1), we also have
￿












Summing and using (1), the constrained-e¢ cient allocation obeys
2

















When agents can trade non-contingent assets in privately known amounts, the standard Euler
equation is satis￿ed, and the expectation of reciprocal future marginal utility is not equal to the
7reciprocal of current marginal utility, as e¢ ciency would require in (6). Indeed, hidden savings
further reduce, beyond what is implied by hidden e⁄ort, the economy￿ s ability to preserve e⁄ort
incentives while decoupling consumption from income realizations.
3 Hidden private insurance
So far, we have illustrated existing results in the context of our model economy, where income
is random for each e⁄ort level, and contingent securities may pay o⁄ upon realization of the
veri￿able contingencies corresponding to observable realizations of y2. We proceed to characterize
the equilibrium role of private insurance from the same constrained-e¢ ciency perspective applied
above, assuming that the realization of y2 and any public transfers contingent on it are observable
and veri￿able, but realized consumption remains unobservable because individual portfolios of
contingent assets are private information.
Individuals choose ￿rst-period e⁄ort e1 and consumption c1 as well as a portfolio of long and
short positions q(z) in contingent securities, so as to solve
max
c1;e1;fq(z)g








where the prices p(z) of contingent securities are expressed in terms of second-period resources,
and taken as given by individuals in competitive equilibrium. The price p(z) of a security that
entitles its purchaser to a unit of income when the purchaser￿ s idiosyncratic realization is y2 = z,
and binds its issuer to pay a unit of income when the issuer￿ s realization is y2 = z, is independent
of the individuals￿identity as long as the distribution of idiosyncratic income realization is the
same for all individuals. Risk-averse individuals will generally take short positions in securities
that pay o⁄ upon high income realizations, long positions in those that pay o⁄ in less fortunate
contingencies.
Competitive trade of such stylized securities may occur through clearing houses, or at insurance
￿rms of inde￿nite size and number, that collect portfolios of assets contingent on a large number
8of di⁄erent individuals￿income realizations. Since all individuals are ex-ante identical, prices of
such securities only depend on the income realization they refer to. As in any insurance market,
however, the payo⁄ of each security does depend on whether or not a speci￿c individual, after
issuing or purchasing the security, experiences the relevant realization. Portfolios of such securities
are riskless if they are diversi￿ed across su¢ ciently many individuals.
3.1 Full ine¢ cient insurance
When it is costless to transfer resources across individuals (and, from the point of view of each
individual, across idiosyncratic income realizations), long and short transactions of realization-
speci￿c claims q(z) = ￿ c2￿z￿(y1￿c1)(1+r) fully insure individuals in the competitive equilibrium
at actuarially fair prices p(z) = f(zje1). In equilibrium pro￿ts are zero and there are no arbitrage
opportunities since
￿z [￿ c2 ￿ z ￿ (y1 ￿ c1)(1 + r)]p(zje1) = ￿z [￿ c2 ￿ z ￿ (y1 ￿ c1)(1 + r)]f(zje1) = 0, (13)
where idiosyncratic random deviations of income realizations from their mean are zero on average.
The long and short sets of securities, which individuals are interested in buying and selling, are
separated by
~ z = ￿ c2 = ￿zf(zje1) + (y1 ￿ c1)(1 + r),
and second-period consumption is fully smoothed
u0(c(z)) = u0(￿ c2);8z: (14)
Both the usual and the reciprocal Euler equation hold at




and, by (3) and (1), the optimality condition for e⁄ort reads v0(e1) = 0. As full insurance implies
that individual consumption is una⁄ected by income realizations, individuals refrain from supplying
9costly e⁄ort, and set e1 to its lowest bound e
ﬂ
.
The incentive e⁄ects of insurance, in fact, are not appropriately taken into account by non-
exclusive anonymous trade of income-contingent securities. As originally pointed out by Pauly
(1974), individual moral hazard is determined by total insurance, and linear pricing of insurance
contracts does not incorporate their marginal impact on e⁄ort incentives.
In our model, an additional unit of state-contingent insurance a⁄ects the probability of that







Recognizing that c(z) = z+q(z)￿
P
fx2Y2g q(x)f(zje1)+(y1￿c1)(1+r) in the ￿rst-order condition



















equals zero by (1), and the sign of the numerator is the same as that of fe(zje1). At the full-
insurance, minimal-e⁄ort equilibrium, e⁄ort would therefore be increased by a reduction of the
positive quantity q(z) of contingent securities that pay o⁄ in the lower portion of the income
distribution￿ s support, where fe(zje1) < 0, and by a less negative q(z) in the higher portion of it,
where fe(zje1) > 0. Since e⁄ort contributes to aggregate production, such reductions of insurance
coverage are bene￿cial: the full insurance outcome of competitive trading of fair contracts at prices
f(zje1) is not constrained-e¢ cient, as the ￿ at consumption-income pro￿le implied by (15) would
ful￿ll the constrained optimality condition (10) under hidden savings and e⁄ort only if fe(￿) = 0
(to imply that ! = 0 and ￿ = 0, since unobservable e⁄ort and saving choices are inconsequential
for e¢ ciency).
If insurance transactions were observable, the marginal price of unit insurance contracts should
include the e⁄ect represented in (16), so as to internalize the social cost of lower e⁄ort. Just like
10hidden intertemporal trade of a non-contingent bond, hidden trade of state-contingent securities
reduces e⁄ort and average consumption to an extent that more than compensates the social wel-
fare gains of smoother consumption patterns. In the economy￿ s equilibrium with hidden savings
individuals self-insure too much, as for example in `brahÆm and Pavoni (2005); and they also pur-
chase too much insurance through hidden, linearly priced state-contingent contracts, as in Pauly
(1974). Insurance contracts can internalize part of this externality by specifying prices in terms of
the total, rather than marginal, quantity purchased (see also Bizer and DeMarzo, 1992). To fully
correct the externality, individual risks should be exclusively covered by a single insurer. This may
be possible for speci￿c risks, such as accidents, where nonlinear pricing schedules are commonly
observed in reality and information is routinely obtained about total coverage when claims are
processed (Shavell, 1979). Exclusivity is much less realistic when, as in our setting, it would entail
observation of the full portfolio of insurance contracts or, equivalently, of each agent￿ s realized
consumption.
Just like hidden savings imply that only suboptimal self insurance can be achieved in hidden-
information settings, only suboptimal full insurance against random events in￿ uenced by hidden
actions is possible when trade in contingent securities is frictionless. Moreover, public contingent
transfers cannot in￿ uence the allocation of consumption when actuarially fair and hidden private
contracts can fully o⁄set them. If upon realization of y2 = z an individual receives a net, possibly
negative transfer s(z) from a public redistribution scheme, along with the amount q(z) paid o⁄ by
private insurance contracts held, the contingent resource constraint in (12) is replaced by




where taxes and transfers net out to zero in the aggregate,
P
x s(x)f(xje1) = 0. Since the amount
of private insurance q(z) can vary so as to perfectly o⁄set public transfers upon each income
realization, so as to ensure that (14) is satis￿ed at the same c(z) for any s(z), the equilibrium
allocation still stabilizes consumption fully, and fails to deliver constrained-optimal e⁄ort incentives.
114 Costly insurance transactions
Since neither full insurance nor the irrelevance of public state-contingent transfers are realistic,
we proceed to illustrate how plausible insurance-provision costs can change these results. We ￿rst
outline below how transaction costs can imply that security prices depend nonlinearly on the total
amount traded. We then characterize the equilibrium and proceed to show how public transfers
can improve the e¢ ciency of the consumption allocation.
We assume that transaction costs vanish smoothly as transactions go to zero, so that we may
continue to focus on interior maximization conditions. This makes our model di⁄erent, in ways
that suit our purposes, from those proposed by Gottardi and Pavoni (2009), where discrete bid-ask
spreads imply q(z) = 0 corner solutions for an intermediate range of z realizations, and by Bisin and
Gottardi (1999), who show that allowing for bid-ask spreads ensures existence of a non-exclusive
trading equilibrium in the presence of adverse-selection information problems.
We suppose that insurance transactions for each contingency are processed by ￿rms that use
decreasing-returns technologies.2 Transaction costs increase the marginal cost of delivering a unit
of goods to consumers who short contingent securities, and reduce the contributions to the ￿rm￿ s
revenues of goods delivered to the ￿rm by consumers who hold long positions in contingent se-
curities. We suppose that the cost of writing a contract for contingent delivery of consumption
goods is unitary when the scale of operations is in￿nitesimally small, but more than proportion-
ally and smoothly increasing in the total amount underwritten by each ￿rm. Formally, denoting
with m(x(z)) the marginal cost of writing x(z) unit contracts for delivery contingent on a speci￿c
realization z we assume that
m(0) = 1; (17)
m0(x) > 0; m00(x) > 0; 8x:
Since writing more claims on speci￿c realizations is more than proportionally expensive, it is not
2Constant returns would imply linearly priced state-contingent contracts, and increasing returns would tend to
concentrate transactions, inconsistently with a competitive market structure and with the realistic non-exclusive
insurance arrangements we focus on.
12e¢ cient for ￿rms to specialize in subsets of the securities￿space, and idiosyncratic uncertainty
cancels out in the customer base of ￿rms that trade all contingent securities with a large number
of individuals. Competitive equilibrium then features risk-neutral price-taking behavior by the
insurance industry: if state z occurs with probability f(zje1) and the typical insurance ￿rm is
issuing or underwriting x(z) such contracts, the price of a contract that will deliver a unit of goods
upon realization of z equals its expected marginal cost,
p(zje1;x(z)) = f(zje1)m(x(z)):











a(0) = 1; a0(x) = (m(x) ￿ a(x))
1
x
; 0 < a0(x) < m0 (x)
is the average cost function implied by the marginal cost function introduced in (17).
In what follows we characterize the implications of this technological structure letting the num-
ber of competitive ￿rms be ￿xed exogenously. In Appendix I, which discusses numerical solution
of the equilibrium, we mention how a ￿nite number of ￿rms could be determined endogenously by
a zero-pro￿t condition and ￿rm-level set-up costs. In both cases, security-level decreasing returns
imply that insurance is ￿smoothly￿imperfect for all individuals across the whole range of possi-
ble income realizations. This di⁄erentiates our model economy from Gottardi and Pavoni (2009)
where security-level bid-ask spreads imply that no insurance contracts are written for a subset of
realizations, and Ales and Maziero (2009) where individual-speci￿c costs imply that in equilibrium
a subset of individuals with low average productivity is uninsured.
As we will see below, decreasing-returns supply of hidden private insurance makes it possible
13for public transfers to a⁄ect equilibrium consumption patterns. We suppose that the public tax
and transfer scheme also entails realistic transaction (or administration) costs which, like those of
private contracts, are de￿ned at the level of income realizations. Denote with b(s(z)) the average
cost of transferring s(z) units of resources to individuals who experience realization z, or collecting
￿s(z) if that contingency makes individuals liable to be taxed. We suppose that the average cost
is nil in the absence of any such transfer, but positive when transfers are not zero and possibly,
but not necessarily, smoothly increasing like the private average cost counterpart.
4.1 Costly private insurance in competitive equilibrium
In competitive equilibrium, the aggregate contingent-security transaction amount ￿ q(z) is taken as
given by each seller and purchaser of contingent assets. We normalize the number of insurance
￿rms to unity, so that ￿ q(x) = x(z), and consider the individual maximization problem
max
c1;e1;fq(z)g








q(x)f(xje1)m(￿ q(x)) + X ￿ T, 8z,
where we denote with X the pro￿ts accruing to the ex-ante identical representative individual
when the decreasing-returns insurance technology is active and with T the lump-sum tax which
￿nances the aggregate net cost (if any) of public taxes and transfers.
Individuals take as given insurance prices, X, and T. Their e⁄ort choice still satis￿es (3), and
combining the ￿rst-order conditions for c1, c(z) and q(z) we ￿nd that for the individually optimal
choice of insurance q(z)
u0(c(z))￿(1 + r)f(zje1) = u0(c1)f(zje1)m(￿ q(z)) 8z 2 Y2: (20)
Summing (20) over all z we see that for (20) to be consistent with the standard Euler condition




p(zje1; ￿ q(z)) =
X
fz2Y2g
f(zje1)m(￿ q(z)) = 1: (21)
Since non-contingent resources can be obtained by holding a fully diversi￿ed portfolio of contingent
securities with non-zero expected value, deviations from actuarial fairness of contingent prices must
average out across realizations, as in (21), to rule out riskless arbitrage opportunities.3
4.2 The consumption e⁄ects of public transfers
Conditions (20) imply that consumption insurance is incomplete: marginal utility varies across







; 8x;y 2 Y2: (22)
In the absence of public transfers, the size of private insurance positions is inversely related to
that of income realizations. Since the amount of security transactions in￿ uences the price and cost
of private insurance, however, taxes and transfers denoted by s(z) can alter both the equilibrium
consumption levels c(z) and the volume q(z) of security transactions.
To see this formally, note that in the ex-ante symmetric equilibrium, where ￿ q(x) = q(x) for all
x 2 Y2, the pro￿ts and lump-sum tax, which the individual problem (19) takes as given, amount
3Dividing by m(￿ q(z)) in (20) and taking the probability-weighted sum we also ￿nd that
u



















a standard asset-pricing equation that constrains expected proportional deviations from actuarial fairness to average
to zero when weighted by the pricing kernel u
0(c(z))=u
0(c1); a state-speci￿c rate of transformation which depends on










In the budget constraint of problem (19), the total cost of operating private and public contingent









￿ ￿ (y1 ￿ c1)(1 + r) ￿
X
fx2Y2g
f(xje1)[q(x)a(q(x)) + s(x)b(s(x))] (23)
and using c(z) = z+q(z)+s(z)+￿ in the individual￿ s ￿rst-order condition for insurance transactions
(20), where ￿ q(z) = q(z) as in ex-ante symmetric equilibrium per-capita averages are equal to




m(c(z) ￿ z ￿ s(z) ￿ ￿): (24)





















and shows that public transfers can in￿ uence security portfolios and consumption patterns when




















u0(c1) ￿(1 + r)
: (25)
16The ￿rst fraction indexes the extent of pass-through of the transfer to contingent consumption,
and ranges between zero (to imply full crowding out by o⁄setting insurance positions) if m0(￿) = 0,
and unity (no crowding out) if m0(q(z)) is very large, or the agent is nearly risk neutral in the
second period. It multiplies the transfer￿ s unitary impact on contingent resources, plus the change
in the common term ￿, de￿ned in (23), of all second-period consumption levels. The second part
of expression (25) captures the impact on insurance costs of changes in the ￿rst-period marginal
utility on the right-hand side of equation (20). This would be the only e⁄ect if m0(q(z)) = 0, in
which case public transfers would a⁄ect second-period consumption levels only through the net
costs (if any) captured by the lump-sum tax T.
4.3 Constrained e¢ ciency
If contingent prices include nonlinear transaction costs, private contracts only partially smooth the
di⁄erences across realizations of disposable income, z+s(z). Hence, they cannot fully o⁄set public
transfers which, therefore, a⁄ect the contingent pro￿le of consumption as well as, through ex-ante
e⁄ort provision incentives and insurance costs, its overall level.
Since the economy￿ s competitive equilibrium is not constrained e¢ cient in the presence of the
informational externalities discussed above, transfers not only can, but should a⁄ect consumption
patterns and e⁄ort choices. To characterize the constrained-e¢ cient allocation we set up the
Lagrangian









































17Unlike problems L1 in (4) and L2 in (8), problem L3 in (26) includes in the last line a summation
of terms that have to be zero if the private insurance ￿rst-order conditions (12) are satis￿ed,
and are multiplied by shadow prices ’(x). These multipliers represent the welfare e⁄ects of the
incentive-compatibility conditions for hidden insurance transactions: ’(x) > 0 for securities that
individuals ￿nd optimal to hold in their portfolios (because they pay o⁄ in high-marginal-utility
contingencies), and ’(x) < 0 for securities that individuals choose to sell short (so that they will
pay, rather than receive, units of consumption when their income is realized at x).
The contingent-transfer schedule s(z) is known to individuals in equilibrium. Given the set of
disposable incomes fz + s(z)g, problem (26) accounts for incentive compatibility which requires
that the hidden choices of e⁄ort e1, consumption c1, and insurance q(z) satisfy the ￿rst-order
conditions of the individual￿ s maximization problem.4 The constrained-e¢ cient allocation imple-
mented by the set of transfers fs(z)g implies that the derivatives of the Lagrangean with respect
to these choice variables are zero, thus ensuring that a marginal change in the allocation is not
welfare-improving.
In our modeling framework, the agent hiddenly chooses state-contingent securities. This makes
it more di¢ cult for the principal to implement the constrained e¢ cient allocation, in ways that
can be characterized by inspection of the condition @L3=@q(z) = 0, which takes into account the
e⁄ect of e⁄ort and insurance choices on the insurance price f(zje1)m(q(z). In order to derive
this condition note that the consumption level c(x) is related to the insurance quantity q(x) by
c(x) = x + q(x) + s(x) + ￿ where ￿, as de￿ned in (23), incorporates the economy-wide resource






= 1[x=z] ￿ f(zje1)m(q(z)),
4The ￿rst-order conditions characterize the optimum only if the Hessian of the objective function is negative
semi-de￿nite. The conditions in `brahÆm, Koehne and Pavoni (2009) are su¢ cient if private security trading is
prohibitively costly, so that incentive compatibility matters only for hidden e⁄ort and non-contingent savings. As
in simpler settings with hidden e⁄ort and hidden savings, little can be said analytically about the constrained-
e¢ cient consumption allocation if we do not assume the validity of the ￿rst-order approach. Below we provide a
plausible numerical example in which we check the properties of the Hessian to ensure that the ￿rst-order approach
is appropriate.
18where the second equality recognizes that @ [q(z)a(q(z))]=@q(z) = m(q(z)) in the partial derivative
of the expression de￿ned in (23) and 1[x=z] is an indicator function which is 1 if x = z and 0
otherwise.
Using the budget constraint to substitute c(x), the aggregate resource constraint in (26) is







































Collecting terms that measure the ex-ante welfare impact of the insurance transaction￿ s mar-
ginal cost ￿ directly and in terms of shadow-price weighted derivatives of the incentive compatibility

















the constrained-e¢ ciency condition (27) can be rearranged to
m(q(z))
u0(c(z))
￿ = 1 + ￿
fe(zje1)
f(zje1)















Since ￿ = ￿=[￿(1 + r)], this expression coincides with its familiar counterpart (9) in the absence
19of hidden costly insurance transactions with ’(z) = 0 and m(0) = 1. Hidden and costly insur-
ance transactions in￿ uence the relationship between income realizations and (marginal utilities of)
consumption levels in the second period, in two conceptually distinct ways.
On the left-hand side of (28) the marginal cost m(q(z)) 6= 1 of additional contingent consump-
tion is higher when income realizations imply relatively high marginal utility. Quite intuitively,
the higher cost of transferring resources across di⁄erent income realizations reduces the scope of
insurance from the social point of view, as well as from the individual one highlighted by expression
(22).
Moreover, the new term in the second line on the right-hand side of (28) captures the way in
which the additional incentive constraints for hidden insurance purchases exacerbate moral hazard.
The severity of the incentive problem is measured by the shadow prices ’(z), which are positive
for securities that pay o⁄ in low income states, and negative for securities shorted by individuals.
The implications for the constrained-e¢ cient pattern of contingent marginal utilities depend on
the di⁄erence between the local concavity of utility and convexity of insurance transaction costs,
u00(c(z))=u0(c(z)) ￿ m0(q(z))=m(q(z)). Since this term is unambiguously negative, the incentive
constraints imposed by hidden insurance transactions imply smoother consumption. In low income
states, for example, the e¢ cient marginal utility of consumption is lower, for a given pattern of
insurance costs m(q(z)).
4.4 Numerical illustration
Hidden costly insurance transactions imply that public transfers fs(z)g can in￿ uence the state-
contingent consumption directly, and also indirectly through their implications for incentives and
insurance choices. The interplay of these channels has intuitive but complex implications for welfare
optimization. On the one hand, substitution of costly private contracts with public transfers may
reduce the overall cost of insurance, depending on the relationship between private transaction
costs and public administration costs. On the other hand, competitive private markets neglect
e⁄ort incentives, and this makes it socially optimal to reduce insurance instead of making it less
expensive.











f(z1je1) = exp(￿￿e1) ￿ 1




Table 1: Parameters for the numerical example
numerical example with two income states z1 and z2. The steps for the numerical solution are
described in Appendix I. Table 1 displays the chosen parameters. We use a quadratic disutility
of e⁄ort and an exponential functional form for the probability f(z1je1) = exp(￿￿e1) so that
f(z2je1) = 1 ￿ exp(￿￿e1). This functional form implies log-convexity of the distribution function
and monotonicity of the likelihood ratio. We use a constant relative risk aversion utility function,
which ful￿lls the su¢ cient conditions for the validity of the ￿rst-order approach with hidden e⁄ort
and savings in `brahÆm, Koehne and Pavoni (2009). Since these conditions are no longer su¢ cient
with hidden insurance, we check the concavity of the problem in our numerical example by verifying
that the eigenvalues of the Hessian at the computed equilibrium are negative.
Two sets of parameters deserve further explanation. We solve the numerical example for three
di⁄erent values of ￿ to illustrate the e⁄ect of di⁄erent slopes for the transaction costs. To give
an example what the values of ￿ mean for the prices of insurance transactions, ￿ = 25 implies
an empirically plausible load of 28% for a contract that increases income by 0:01. The speci￿ed
incomes z1 and z2 imply that the expected income in the second period is between 3% and 13%
higher than in the ￿rst period, depending on the income compression with public transfers and the
corresponding changes in e⁄ort.
Figures 1 and 2 display the results. In Figure 1 we plot the equilibrium variables for di⁄er-
ently compressed income in the second period. Along the horizontal axis, the ￿gure measures the
amount x of resources transferred from the high-income to the low-income contingency. The re-
21sulting income compression reduces private insurance transactions, but does not eliminate private
insurance completely over the 0 ￿ x ￿ 0:2 range considered in Figure 1. It also reduces the extent
to which consumption responds to income realizations, and therefore decreases equilibrium e⁄ort
and (precautionary) savings. As illustrated in the ￿gure, the equilibrium also depends on the slope
of transaction costs ￿: when unit transaction costs are more steeply increasing, insurance is more
limited and e⁄ort is higher.
Public contingent transfers improve welfare through reduction of consumption volatility and of
costly private insurance, worsen welfare through reduction of e⁄ort incentives, and may of course
entail transaction and administration costs of their own. To summarize the interplay of these
factors, we compute numerically the second-period lump-sum tax that would equalize welfare
across the equilibria with and without a public insurance scheme resulting in income compression:
if the (unspeci￿ed) administration costs of the public redistribution scheme are smaller, then the
scheme is socially bene￿cial.
The left panel of Figure 2 plots, for di⁄erent values of the critical parameter ￿, the ratio of
the lump-sum-equivalent welfare gain to the amount of implemented income compression. We see
that, for example, if ￿ = 25 then income compression by x = 0:1 improves welfare as long as
its administration absorbs less than three quarters of the amount transferred from good to bad
realizations. This critical cost ratio falls if income is more compressed, indicating that further
income compression becomes less attractive.
Specifying a cost for public transactions then makes it possible to determine the optimal size of
the public redistribution policy. The size and shape of private transaction costs play an important
role from that perspective. A larger ￿ shifts the curve upwards, and makes public insurance more
attractive for any speci￿cation of its cost: public insurance has more positive welfare implications
when hidden private transactions face steeply increasing costs and can implement only shallow and
very costly consumption smoothing.




























































































































































Figure 1: The equilibrium as a function of second-period income compression for di⁄erent private-
insurance transaction cost parameters.














































































Figure 2: The welfare e⁄ect of public insurance, gross of implementation costs, in lump-sum
equivalent terms.
235 A look at the facts
The model quite intuitively predicts that private insurance should be less developed when trans-
action costs are more strongly increasing; that public insurance is more intense when incentive
constraints are less binding, risk aversion is stronger and public insurance is less costly; but also
that there is scope for public transfers only when private insurance is costly. These and other
features may explain the variation across countries of private and public insurance.
We focus on transaction and administration costs as an essential element of realistically im-
perfect insurance systems, and explore the extent to which they can ceteris paribus explain cross-
country evidence. Although the available data heavily constrain the empirical analysis, the data
show that transaction costs are sizeable and important, supporting the relevance of our modeling
perspective.
We measure di⁄erences in public and private insurance provision across countries using data
on private insurance claims from the OECD Insurance Statistics Yearbook and data on public
social expenditures from the OECD Social Expenditure Database. To focus on public and private
insurance against labor market and health shocks, we use the amount of non-life private insurance
claims for private insurance and exclude pensions in the public-insurance data. Comparable data
are available for the 1996-2005 decade. Since the time-series variation in the private-insurance
data is rather noisy, we summarize its cross-country variation with the median over that period.
Further details about the data set are in Appendix II.
Figure 3 shows that no obvious pattern emerges when we plot public against private insurance.
Vast di⁄erences are observed across countries in both the total amount and composition of insurance
amounts. Public social insurance transfers are about 20% of GDP in Scandinavian countries, and
less than 15% of GDP in the US or Canada. Across these groups of countries private insurance
expenditures appear to substitute public schemes: in the US and Canada, non-life private insurance
at about 3% of GDP is much more important than in Scandinavian countries. But other countries
(such as Italy, Greece, Turkey, Japan and South Korea) have a small volume in both public and
private insurance. Across the OECD sample, the correlation coe¢ cient between public and private
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Non-life insurance claims per GDP
Figure 3: Public and private insurance across OECD countries. Notes: 1996-2003 and 1996-2005
averages in % of GDP, respectively. Public insurance is measured as social expenditure per GDP
other than pension and survivorship payments (source: OECD, Social Expenditure Database); pri-
vate insurance is measured as claims per GDP, excluding life insurance (source: OECD, Insurance
Statistics Yearbook). Solid graph: predicted values of linear regression.
measures for public and private insurance to available transaction cost indicators.
We use OECD data on administration costs per net revenue collection as our measure for
transaction costs of public insurance and operating expenses per claim as our measure of transaction
costs for private insurance.5 These data are far from perfect. For example, operating expenses also
include acquisition/sales costs which may or may not be spread over the duration of contracts in
the balance sheet of insurance ￿rms. The data capture some of the variation we are interested in,
however, and are the best data available for our purposes.
Figures 4 and 5 show that the transaction costs di⁄er considerably across countries and are
negatively related to public and private insurance transactions, consistent with our model. For
example, the low public and private insurance in a Mediterranean country like Portugal is associated
with relatively high administration costs of tax collection (about 2% of the revenues) and high
5Since there are no data on claims and operating expenses for the US, we use 18% as a proxy for the private
transaction cost per claim in the US, suggested by the estimates of the loading factor in Brown and Finkelstein￿ s
(2007) analysis of the US long-term care market. As a proxy for US claims, we use the data on gross-written non-life
insurance premiums for the US and compute claims by multiplying US premiums with the claim/premium ratio
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Tax admininistration costs per net revenue collections
Figure 4: Public insurance and its cost in %. Notes: Social expenditure is the average for the
period 1996-2003 in the Social Expenditure Database, OECD. The tax administration cost is the
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Operating expenses per claim for non-life insurance
Figure 5: Private insurance and its costs in %. Notes: Medians for the period 1996-2005. Data are
from the OECD, Insurance Statistics Yearbook. Solid graph: predicted values of linear regression.
26operating expenses per claim (about 40% of claims) in the private insurance market. Scandinavian
and Anglo-Saxon countries both have lower operating expenses per claim than most countries
(about 20-30%) but Scandinavian countries also have rather low public administration costs (at
less than 1% of collected revenues, even lower than in Anglo-Saxon countries like Australia, Canada
or the UK).
The bivariate correlation between social expenditures and administration costs in Figure 4 is
-0.29. The value becomes -0.43 and signi￿cant at the 5% level if we exclude South Korea which is
an outlier in Figure 4. The bivariate correlation between non-life insurance claims and operating
expenses per claim in Figure 5 is -0.48, strongly signi￿cant at little more than 1%. The association
between transaction costs and insurance is also quantitatively important. Regressing public social
expenditure on a constant and public transaction costs (excluding South Korea) reveals that an
increase of public transaction costs by one standard deviation (0.43 percentage points) is associated
with 1.4 percentage points less public insurance. Analogously, an increase of private transaction
costs by one standard deviation (14.32 percentage points) is associated with 0.35 percentage points
less private insurance.
These results remain very similar if we add private transaction costs as a control in the re-
gression for public insurance and public transaction costs as control in the regression for private
insurance. Neither of the additional controls is signi￿cant in such speci￿cations, a ￿nding that
is consistent with our model, where higher transaction costs for private insurance make public
transfers more e⁄ective in altering consumption levels, but also change the constrained-e¢ cient
amounts of transfers.
6 Concluding comments
The modeling framework developed in this paper o⁄ers distinctive and qualitatively general insights
into the implications of private insurance for public insurance policies. In theory, transaction costs
in private insurance markets play a crucial role in making it possible for public transfers to a⁄ect the
consumption allocation, and in shaping the amount and character of constrained-optimal public
insurance policies. We show that the extent to which e¢ cient public transfers smooth income
27shocks depends on the trade-o⁄ between incentive provision and the dissipation of resources due
to wasteful transaction costs. We provide evidence that insurance activities are indeed costly in
reality, and we ￿nd that available cross-country information on the cost of public and private
insurance systems are sensibly and signi￿cantly related to their size. Our look at the facts also
indicates that a substantial part of private and public insurance variation remains unexplained by
transaction costs.
Our framework may be extended in several directions. Various aspects of private insurance
organization are potentially relevant to the pricing and information basis of private insurance
contracts. Market concentration and information pooling facilities can reduce supply of ine¢ ciently
generous private insurance, and are shaped in reality by regulatory and privacy-protection policies.
While we have focused on contingent public transfers, the information asymmetries that imply
excessive hidden insurance may be addressed by linear taxation of anonymous trades, along the
lines of Golosov and Tsyvinski￿ s (2007) analysis of hidden-savings equilibria. Further research
could also aim to assess the empirical realism of our model￿ s predictions for the coexistence and
interaction of public and private insurance, relative to those of the limited enforcement framework
of Krueger and Perri (2009) or of the partial exclusive insurance equilibrium studied by Ales and
Maziero (2009).
Appendix
Part I: Numerical solution of the equilibrium
For a given number of ￿rms N, we iterate over the consumption function c(z).
(i) We start from the no-insurance, no-savings consumption pro￿le c(zi) = zi.
(ii) We then use our parametric assumptions, f(z1je1) = exp(￿￿e1) and equation (3) to ￿nd e1
which solves









exp(￿￿e1)c(z1)￿￿ + (1 ￿ exp(￿￿e1))c(z2)￿￿￿￿￿ 1
￿ .
28(iv) We retrieve q(z1) and q(z2) using m(￿ q(z)=N) = exp(￿￿ q(z)=N), ￿ q(z) = q(z) in the symmetric





















(v) We use the budget constraint to update c(z):




for z 2 fz1;z2g, where X as de￿ned in (18) rebates to consumers the operational pro￿ts of insurance













We the restart with step (ii) and iterate until c(z) has converged at precision 10￿8.
It is straightforward to let the number of ￿rms N be determined by a ￿xed cost ￿ of operation












updates N after c(z) has converged, and we restart with step (ii) until N has converged.
Part II: Data appendix
We use available OECD data for the time period 1996-2005 in our empirical analysis where not
all sample years are available for all variables and some countries such as Mexico and Switzerland
are excluded because of missing data. The variables are de￿ned as follows.
Non-old age social expenditure per GDP: Total public social expenditure minus the expendi-
tures in the categories ￿old age￿and ￿survivors￿ , divided by GDP. Average for the years 1996-2003
29in the OECD Social Expenditure Database. Our measure for public social expenditure includes (i)
incapacity-related bene￿ts (care services, disability bene￿ts, bene￿ts accruing from occupational
injury and accident legislation, employee sickness payments); (ii) health (in- and out-patient care,
medical goods, prevention); (iii) family (child allowances and credits, child care support, income
support during leave, sole parent payments); (iv) active labor market policies (employment ser-
vices, training youth measures subsidized employment, employment measures for the disabled);
(v) unemployment (unemployment compensation, severance pay, early retirement for labor market
reasons); housing (housing allowances and rent subsidies); and (vi) other social policy areas (non-
categorical cash bene￿ts to low-income households, other social services; i.e. support programs
such as food subsidies).
Tax administration costs per net revenue collection: Annual costs of administration incurred
by a revenue authority divided by the revenue collected over the course of a ￿scal year. Average
for the years 2000-2002 in OECD (2004), Table 17.
Non-life insurance claims per GDP: Gross claims payments, covering all gross payments on
claims made during the ￿nancial year, divided by GDP. Median, by country, for the years 1996-
2005 in the OECD Insurance Statistics Yearbook. Non-life insurance includes, among others,
insurance in the categories motor vehicle, maritime and aviation, freight, ￿re and property damages,
pecuniary losses, general liability accident and health. Data on claims for the US are not available
and imputed using the median of gross non-life insurance premiums multiplied by the average
claim-premium ratio for those OECD countries for which data on both premiums and claims are
available.
Operating expenses per claim for non-life insurance: Gross operating expenses are the sum
of acquisition costs, change in deferred acquisition costs and administrative expenses. These are
divided by claims. Median, by country, for the years 1996-2005 in the OECD Insurance Statistics
Yearbook. Data for the US are not available and are imputed using the estimate for the loading
factor of 1.18 for the long-term care market in Brown and Finkelstein (2007).
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